




Ought euthanasia be practiced for persons with advanced dementia? 
Although the issue of euthanasia is a topic of increasingly heated social 
debate, already tending to polarize those who support it as voluntary 
“aid-in-dying” and those who reject it as medical “killing,” what is said 
about active euthanasia on both sides is severely challenged by the 
question of euthanasia in Alzheimer’s disease. Whether euthanasia may 
or should be practiced in Alzheimer’s is not an easy moral or social- 
policy question to answer, as 1 shall try to show, even if one finds the 
answers to moral and policy questions about euthanasia comparatively 
simple in other contexts.
In showing why the question of euthanasia in Alzheimer’s is so 
difficult to answer, I’d like to survey the three most prevalent argu­
ments for euthanasia in general, the arguments from autonomy, from 
mercy, and from justice (Battin, 1987), and show what is problematic 
about each. All three yield indeterminate answers. Although none of 
these conventional arguments for euthanasia seems to be effective in 
the specific circumstanccs of Alzheimer’s, the considerations they raise 
also fail to produce effective arguments against euthanasia. But a philo­
sophically indeterminate position of this sort seems a luxury, given the 
literally millions of people potentially directly affected by social poli­
cies that might be formulated on the basis of such discussions. Given 
these inconclusive results, I then turn to look at what is usually the 
principal argument against euthanasia— the “slippery-slope” argument 
— and find that it gives equally disturbing results. Finally, I look briefly 
at the question this situation poses: How can one formulate social
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policy in such a sensitive matter as this, when background philosoph­
ical considerations do not seem to prove much help?
What I shall be considering here is whether active euthanasia may 
be practiced on persons with advanced Alzheimer’s— that is, direct 
killing, performed in the paradigmatic case by a physician as a medical 
procedure intended to produce death. It is without question the case 
that in terminal illness we already often practice what philosophers 
(but not doctors or the general public) call passive euthanasia: the with­
holding or withdrawal of treatment that would otherwise prolong life, 
thus “allowing” the patient to die. We also often practice a form of 
life curtailment involving the overadministration of morphine; in these 
eases, it is usually argued, the intention is to relieve pain, and the 
respiratory suppression that results in death is a foreseen but unin­
tended consequence. While both of these may and do occur in Alzhei­
mer’s, I shall be considering neither here: I am concerned with whether 
directly produced death, produced because of the Alzheimer’s rather 
than for other reasons, is morally warranted. To be sure, any discus­
sion of the moral issues in euthanasia rejects the categorical argument 
that killing or causing the death of human beings is always wrong; 
pointing to practices often regarded as morally acceptable, including 
killing in self-defense, just war, abortion, and capital punishment, such 
a discussion presupposes that if any of these practices are morally 
permissible, it must be argued, not assumed, that killing in euthanasia 
cannot also be so.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING EUTHANASIA, 
AS APPLIED TO ADVANCED DEMENTIA
THE ARGUMENT FROM AUTONOMY
In contemporary defenses of active euthanasia, it is often argued 
that the right to determine the character and timing of one’s own death, 
wherever doing so is possible, is a basic human right, grounded in 
fundamental rights of self-determination and autonomy generally. Such 
autonomy rights include all choices that are self-respecting only and 
do not seriously damage the interests or violate the rights of others, 
and certainly include, it is argued, rights of choice in matters so pro­
found and intimately personal as deciding whether to continue to live 
or to die. On this view, a course of action one knowingly and volun­
tarily chooses, provided it does not harm others, is one to which a 
person has at least one and perhaps two sorts of rights: the negative 
right not to be interfered with in the performance of the action and 
perhaps in addition the positive right to be aided in or provided with 
means for accomplishing the action. O f course, there may be grounds
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for interference with exercise of this right either when it is chosen in 
an irrational, impaired way or when the interests of other parties would 
be jeopardized (say, those of minor children who would be left unsup­
ported), but these circumstances are typically irrelevant in choices con­
cerning euthanasia in Alzheimer’s. O n the argument from autonomy, 
the patient who knowingly and voluntarily elects death in preference 
to a medical situation such as Alzheimer’s ought not be interrupted in 
any attempt to commit suicide and may even have claim to positive 
aid in physician-assisted suicide or physician-performed euthanasia. 
By and Large, suicide by the Alzheimer’s patient is possible only just 
after diagnosis or in the comparatively early stages of the disease, when 
he or she is still able to form and act on a plan and is likely to have 
access to means of suicide; active euthanasia could of course be per­
formed at any point, though the issue I wish to address here is euthana­
sia in the late stages of the disease.
But is it meaningful at all to speak of autonomous choice in Alzhei­
mer’s? Can euthanasia be voluntary, the product of informed, free 
choice, in Alzheimer’s? Given that Alzheimer’s eventually involves 
complete deterioration of all cognitive skills, including the capacity 
to conceptualize, predict, understand information, deliberate about a 
matter, reason, or perform any sort of planning, it would seem that an 
Alzheimer’s patient, at least in the advanced stages of dementia, could 
hardly choose euthanasia. After all, for such a choice to be fully enough 
informed to count as voluntary, the person must be able to understand 
not only the medical procedures actually used to produce death, but 
also the abstract notion of the transition from life to death. But while 
an advanced Alzheimer’s patient may exhibit some behavior that looks 
like choosing in certain simple contexts— using a red crayon rather 
than a green one when coloring, for example, or sitting down or getting 
up from a chair—we do not suppose that these actions involve choice 
in any robust way or that they are anything more than simple responses 
to stimuli. We certainly do not think that such actions provide real 
evidence of abstract choice.
On the other hand, it would seem that choices of euthanasia govern­
ing the advanced Alzheimer’s patient must be recognized as voluntary 
if they are made by the person while still competent and recorded in 
an advance-directive document such as a living will. The living will 
provides legally valid evidence (in most U.S. states) of a person’s 
choiccs about treatment after she becomes incompetent. (Feminine pro­
noun has been used because, statistically, most patients are female.) 
To be sure, living-wili declarations at the current moment in the United 
States cannot contain provisions concerning active euthanasia; in the 
Netherlands, in contrast, where euthanasia is legally tolerated, at least
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one standard living-will form docs contain a provision permitting the 
request of active euthanasia, and we can imagine legislation permitting 
such choices in this country too. Of course, the living will brings with 
it various problems, among them that the signer of it may not correctly 
foresee the range of medical problems to occur in her future, that one 
may fluctuate in and out of competence and hence in and out of being 
subject to the provisions of one’s own living will, or that one can revoke 
one’s own living will after becoming no longer competent but cannot 
then later reexecute it. Nevertheless, the living will, which functions 
by recognizing precedent autonomy, is designed to expand the range 
of choices a person can make about herself: It gives legal force to 
choiccs that will take cffcct after that person is no longer currently 
capable of making any choice at all. If that person knew she might 
develop Alzheimer’s and chose— with full information, and perfectly 
voluntarily— to request euthanasia should that occur, it is argued, this 
choice ought to be respected.
But does the living will actually represent a voluntary choice of 
the Alzheimer’s patient? After all, the person whom this choice now 
concerns— the one perhaps to be put to death as a result of this choice, 
if euthanasia has been requested—can no longer understand the choice 
or reenact making it; indeed, the severely demented person cannot 
even remember making this profoundly important choice. After all, 
the choice was made by a long-distant version of herself, whom she no 
longer even remembers being. Can we actually say that she made this 
choice? Since in the United States only choices resulting in earlier 
death by withholding or withdrawing treatment are currently recog­
nized, not choices employing active euthanasia, and since physicians, 
family members, payers, and others rarely object to choices to with­
hold or withdraw in severe dementia, the philosophical issue of the 
legitimacy of the advance directive is rarely raised. Nevertheless, the 
same issue seems to become much more pressing in the case of a highly 
contentious provision like a request for active euthanasia. Is it plausible 
to say that this person, the one who is now severely demented and 
has no awareness of her previous advance directive, knowingly and 
voluntarily requests to be killed? If it is not plausible, is there convinc­
ing reason for recognizing such a choice?
But then, can we actually say that she did not make this choice? It 
was her hand that put the pen to the paper, signing it; it was she who 
discussed it with her lawyer and relatives; it was she who was the legal 
agent employing a recognized legal instrument for effecting her own 
choicc conccrning the very circumstance in which she now finds her­
self. Choice is always choice about one’s own future, though the time 
gap between present and future may be longer or shorter and the
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conditions more or less different. Only by adopting a Humean or 
Parfitean account of the self, in which there is no genuine continuity 
of person over time but only a set of overlapping bundles or person- 
stages, can we so radically divorce the present patient from her own 
former self as to say it is not her choice. She has changed, and changed 
dramatically, to be sure, but it is still she, we are inclined to say, who 
wrote the directive. After all, if it wasn’t she who executed the direc­
tive, what other person did it?
The difference between these two conceptions is what Ronald 
Dworkin describes as the difference in conceiving of the Alzheimer’s 
patient as “a demented person” or as “a person who has become de­
mented” (Dworkin, 1986, p. 4). If we employ the former view, we give 
primary weight to current choices, allowing them to supersede prior 
ones (as, for example, in revoking a living will); on the latter, we give 
primary weight to the choices of the previously undemented person. 
Dworkin favors recognizing precedent rather than current autonomy 
in severe dementia, primarily because the value of autonomy lies in 
the way “autonomy makes each of us responsible for shaping his own 
life according to some coherent and distinctive sense of character, con­
viction, and interests” (p. 8); what is essential is the integrity of a 
person’s life plan. This may be a reasonable policy proposal, but it 
does not really answer the philosophical question: Ought we recognizc 
precedent autonomy in these extreme cases where the agent can no 
longer recognize her former self, or is autonomy here, if possible at all, 
always necessarily contemporary?
Can euthanasia in advanced Alzheimer’s be voluntary? This, as we 
said, is not an easy question to answer, and even the sophisticated 
legal device of the living will, intended to cover circumstances of later 
incompetence precisely such as these, does not decide the philosophical 
question.
THE ARGUMENT FROM MERCY .
Even though it is not clear whether euthanasia in advanced Alzhei­
mer’s can be voluntary, can it nevertheless be a gesture of mercy? 
Traditional arguments for euthanasia have often been arguments from 
mercy: that euthanasia is morally permissible when it is the only effec­
tive way to relieve a patient’s pain or suffering and to spare the patient 
an otherwise agonizing death. Thus, regardless of whether euthanasia 
in advanced Alzheimer’s can be voluntary, it is still open to question 
whether it might be legitimized, or perhaps even morally mandated, 
on grounds of mercy. This is not a question of the sufferings of others, 
especially family members who serve as principal caregivers, but of 
the sufferings of the Alzheimer’s victim herself.
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After all, while the early Alzheimer’s patient can often still function 
fairly well, it is a long road downhill, and the advanced Alzheimer’s 
patient’s sufferings seem to be extreme. She loses her capacities for 
effective function in the world; she is increasingly bewildered by her 
circumstances; and she loses her capacity for interaction with family 
and friends, even those closest to her. She cannot read, think, play any 
game, or converse with anyone; and she cannot, as the traditional 
stereotype of benign old age would have it, sit in a rocking chair sifting 
through her memories of youth. Hers is a world without meaning, 
without purpose or project, without affectional ties. This is the condi­
tion the Dutch call entluistering, the “effacement” or complete eclipse 
of human personality, and for the Dutch, entluistering rather than pain 
is a primary reason for choices of euthanasia. Worse still, in those 
forms of Alzheimer’s which involve paranoid delusions, the patient’s 
experience may be peopled with creatures and situations or horren­
dously threatening sorts, but whose patterns she cannot predict and 
whose terms she cannot understand well enough to escape or accept. 
In some cases, dementia may be a kind of ongoing nightmare, full of 
shadows and threats that do not vanish when one wakes. Thus it looks 
as though euthanasia in advanced Alzheimer’s might be warranted on 
grounds of mercy, whether or not it is voluntarily requested, because 
the mental suffering it involves may be so great.
But does the argument from mercy really succeed in Alzheimer’s? 
We arc often reluctant to speak of suffering where there is no self-aware 
subject of experiences; if this is so, the Alzheimer's victim cannot be 
said to be suffering. True, as an organism with a nervous system, the 
Alzheimer’s victim, like other persons and also like animals, can of 
course feel pain, but pain is not to be confused with the distinctive 
kind of suffering the loss of cognitive function is said to produce. But 
does it? Does a person whose life is void of meaningful activity or 
important interpersonal contact thereby suffer? Or it is rather that 
her sensorium merely includes isolated, unconnected, uninterpreted 
sensory experiences but no cognitive awareness or experience of what 
she is missing? But if she has no awareness of what she is missing, she 
cannot suffer, anymore than one’s pet dog experiences suffering from 
being unable to talk or do arithmetic or from being unable to plan for 
its own future. Even the demented patient with paranoid delusions, if 
she no longer has any sense of self, cannot suffer, it would seem, since 
there is no self there to whom these awful experiences happen; they 
occur, but in a mental void. But if these things are true and we 
take the having of a sense of self—that self-awareness often counted 
as distinctively human and as presupposed by the very notion of 
person— as prerequisite for suffering, then as the deterioration of Alz­
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heimer’s advances, the potential for suffering decreases. Paradoxically, 
it might seem, the greater the patient’s losses, the weaker her claim to 
euthanasia on grounds of mercy.
'Hie traditional argument for euthanasia on grounds of mercy points 
to physical pain and emotional suffering, but the former is irrelevant 
in the case of Alzheimer’s and it is not clear whether the latter can 
occur. It is of course true that an Alzheimer’s patient might have some 
untreatable coexisting medical condition about which the question of 
euthanasia because of intractable pain might be raised, but then this is 
not a question of euthanasia because of Alzheimer’s and would have 
only tangential bearing on the million persons with severe Alzheimer’s; 
the two to three million more with milder, though progressive, Alzhei­
mer’s; and indeed the rest of us, who, if we live to age 85, stand a one 
in four chance of developing it. But this just raises the question all 
over again: Do we not fear developing Alzheimer’s because we do not 
want to suffer in this way?
If neither considerations of choice nor considerations of mercy will 
decide whether euthanasia should be performed for Alzheimer’s pa­
tients, how then should we develop social policy in this very difficult 
matter? What about the argument that to keep such people alive defies 
any defensible principle of distributive justice— in other words, that 
to keep such people alive is a waste?
THE ISSUE OF JUSTICE
It is also often popularly argued that the expenditure of funds to 
care for Alzheimer’s victims is a “waste.” This is a form of distributive 
argument; it is based on the assumption that there are other more 
defensible distributions of health care and that it would be more just 
to allocate these resources to other parties with stronger claims to them 
than to have them consumed by Alzheimer’s patients who are already 
severely demented and will never recover. While the cruder forms of 
the popular argument rarely spell out what distributive arrangement 
ought to be considered more just, what sorts of claims to resources 
would outweigh those of Alzheimer’s patients, or what assurances of 
actual redistribution would need to be made, this argument neverthe­
less often seems to exert considerable intuitive pull: There is something 
unjust, it is said, about committing large amounts of resources to peo­
ple who arc “already gone” while denying help to others in current 
need.
While it is usually considered a distinct argument, this appeal to 
justice nevertheless trades on the claims involved in the issues we have 
already discussed, those of autonomy and mercy. After all, justice in 
the distribution of resources presupposes that potential claimants to
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these resources would actually wish to have them or that the receip t 
of them would actually count as a benefit. If a prospective claim ant 
would not want the resources and they would not be a benefit to h im  
or her, then a distributive scheme allocating resources to this party  is 
unjust if there are other claimants who would want the resources an d  
for whom they would be a benefit. Like the proverbial “dog in th e  
manger,” there is no justice in allocating scarce resources to a p a r ty  
who cannot use them; similarly, there is no justice in allocating th em  
to a party who does not want them. Yet given the indeterminate re su lts  
of the preceding sketches of the issues of choice and mercy, it is by no  
means clear that Alzheimer’s patients “want” the resources that m ig h t 
be allocated to them or that these resources would count as a “benefit.
It is important to note that this is not the same as the “useless eaters 
argument advanced by the Nazis as grounds for the destruction o f  
mentally retarded persons and others, though it would have been ap ­
plied in some of the same cases. The “useless eaters” argument does 
not assert that the use of resources is not of benefit to the person in  
question; it asserts that this use of resources is not of benefit to o th ers  
in the sense that the person in question is “useless” to society. ITic! c 
is no issue in the current question about whether the Alzheimer’s p a ­
tient is “useful” to others, but instead about whether the resources a re  
useful to him or her. Although the two arguments are easily confused, 
there is in the background of the current discussion about justice in  
Alzheimer’s the assumption that whether or not Alzheimer’s patien ts 
arc “useful’’ to others or to society in general, society is willing to  
provide care that is useful to them.
But this then returns us to the problem. Does the Alzheimer s p a ­
tient want the resources, and arc they a benefit to her? Even if claim s 
on her behalf are pressed by a surrogate, can these claims reflect e ith e r 
substituted judgment or any form of best-interests test? Clearly, th e  
more advanced the deteriorative process, the less plausible it is to speak 
of contemporary choice in wanting resources: The severely dem ented 
patient cannot, presumably, understand any other arrangement o f  
things, nor can she conceptualize the distributive schema itself or th e  
allocations it makes to her in competition with others. Nor, p resu m ­
ably, can the severely demented patient in any conscious sense “w a n t” 
the continuing life that medical treatment and maintenance care m ake 
possible, though of course her bodily processes may continue to o p e r­
ate in the normal, life-continuing way; as we said, this person can no  
longer have any conception of what life is or of the transition from life 
to death. O f course, she may have had a vigorous conception o f all 
these things prior to the onset of serious disease and may have recorded  
her wishes in a living will or other document; in this sense, the no w —
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demented person still may “want” access to resources she earlier chose. 
She can also react favorably to situations she experiences as pleasant 
and react negatively to those that involve discomfort or pain; in this 
sense, she can “want” allocations of resources that provide her with, 
say, foods she prefers, a more comfortable bed, better-fitting clothing 
(but not more stylish clothing, since appreciating style requires cogni­
tive abilities), and so on. But she can neither conceptualize these wants 
nor, except by expressions of pleasure or displeasure, articulate them.
Can the severely demented patient benefit from the allocation of 
resources to her care, including medical treatment, maintenance care, 
and whatever else is necessry to keep her alive? The answer here is 
clearly dependent on the argument considered earlier about mercy, and 
hence we cannot arrive at any clearer answer. Does she benefit from 
remaining alive, or would she be better off dead? There is quite a lively 
discussion in the philosophic and economic literature about the value 
of life, and how one can weigh this against death (Brueckner and Fi­
scher, 1986; Brock, 1986), but it is not a discussion that proves decisive 
in the present case. Many or most of the features that are usually said 
to make life worth living are absent in advanced dementia— for exam­
ple, the possibilities of enjoying human interaction, planning and un­
dertaking projects, serving causes, having religious and aesthetic expe­
rience, and perhaps (as Aristotle would identify as the highest good) 
rational contemplation. With no surviving conceptual skills or even 
sense of self, it is not clear that continuing life is a continuing good, 
and hence not clear that allocations that make continuing life possible 
are really a benefit after all. Nor, however, is it clear that they arc not.
What, then, is a fair distribution of resources with respect to people 
with Alzheimer’s? It is not clear that we can even begin to answer this 
question, because we cannot identify either what Alzheimer’s patients 
want or what would benefit them. Furthermore, we cannot identify 
wants and benefits either on subjective grounds or on objective, 
quality-of-life ones: We cannot approximate the severely demented per­
son’s point of view, and we cannot assess the quality of her life. O f 
course, to identify what various claimants want and what would be of 
benefit to them is not all that is involved in settling distributive issues, 
since many other matters (for instance, deserts, prior claims, needs for 
rectification) are involved; but one cannot even get off the ground in 
justifying a given distributive scheme without knowing whether the 
various claimants to the resources involved actually want and/or would 
benefit from them. Discussions of distributive justice uniformly as­
sume that the various competing claimants involved all want and would 
benefit from the resource in question— that is, that they are all appro­
priately considered claimants— but in the case of Alzheimer’s no such 
thing is clear. Since the amount of resources involved in the issue of
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Alzheimer’s is immense, the quesiton of justice is an enormous one, 
and to say that we simply cannot resolve it on adequate philosophical 
grounds is no trivial matter.
DEVELOPING POLICY CONCERNING EUTHANASIA IN ALZHEIMER'S
Of course, positions on the issue of justice are ultimately expressed in 
social policy, which puts into practice one or another distributive 
scheme allocating resources to or away from various claimants or ap­
parent claimants for them. Needless to say, the development of social 
policy in the matter of allocating resources in Alzheimer’s is a matter 
with such high stakes that it can hardly wait for philosophers to sift 
through these questions, especially when there is no indication that 
they will reach a uniform, workable answer. In the absence of firm 
philosophical justification, then, what form should social policy take 
in expressing these issues of justice?
To simplify a huge range of possibilities, there are three principal 
candidates for social policies distributing medical and supportive care 
in Alzheimer's:
1. do what is possible to maintain and supply medical and support­
ive treatment for Alzheimer’s patients, though without heroics, until 
the end of their natural lives;
2. practice passive euthanasia on late-stage Alzheimer’s patients: 
provide maintenance and support but not lifesaving medical treat­
ment, and so allow these patients to die when infections or other 
potential fatal conditions arise; or
3. practice active euthanasia on late-stage Alzheimer’s patients.
Current social policy, not at all well defined, wavers between alter­
natives #1 and #2 , though #2  is never termed “euthanasia.” It is #3 
that raises the question under discussion here. In the absence of firm 
answers to the questions of choice and mercy, we must still answer 
the question, Should we, or should we not, practice active euthanasia 
for Alzheimer’s patients? To refuse to address this question is already 
to answer it, since current social policy prohibits active euthanasia, 
though permitting passive euthanasia, and to refuse to raise the ques­
tion is to accept the current answer. It is not clear, however, that this 
answer is a defensible one. But perhaps there are still other ways of 
looking at the issue.
THE VIEW DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
Another, more clearly consequentialist way of approaching the is­
sues in euthanasia in Alzheimer’s, or for that matter any proposed
social policy, is to take a look down the “slippery slope,” that is, to 
examine the likely highly negative outcomes of introducing the policy. 
The slippery-slope argument as usually employed against euthanasia 
predicts the spread of medical killing from a few sympathetic cases, 
genuinely dictated by the wishes of the patient or the demands of 
mercy, to more problematic medical cases, then to cases of expensive 
patients, then to politically undesirable cases, and finally to widespread 
holocaust. Regardless of whether the advanced Alzheimer’s patient 
wants or would benefit from continuing life, it is argued, active eutha­
nasia ought not be employed, for this would risk the spread of this 
practice to other persons who both want to remain alive and would 
benefit by doing so.
Slippery-slope arguments trade on empirical claims about likely con­
sequences, either direct causal results of a certain policy or conse­
quences resulting from other forces affectcd by the precedents set by 
a policy. Much of the continuing argumentation about euthanasia in­
volves trading claims about how far the slide would go and how broad 
the spread of the increasingly intolerable practice would be, and it very 
often cites catastrophic events such as the Nazi Holocaust as evidence 
for its claims. When these slippery-slope arguments do so, they gener­
ally trade on assumptions about the evil motives of human beings and 
of physicians in particular, often making reference to the Nazi doctors 
and their increasing callousness about human experimentation and 
killing.
It is true that the Nazis’ early T4 program began with medical 
“euthanasia” and that medical staff from this program were later trans­
ferred to the extermination camps; but this historical transition docs 
not establish that any practice of euthanasia will always lead to holo­
caust or that human beings generally or physicians in particular are 
evil. There are apparent counterexamples: Active euthanasia is prac­
ticed in contemporary Holland without evident abuse, and it was also 
apparently practiced (by recommending the hemlock) in ancicnt 
Greece (Battin, 1982, p. 22). However, while the empirical issues can 
hardly be settled here, it is reasonable to suppose that human beings 
generally and physicians in particular rapidly respond to incentives of 
various kinds, especially legal and financial ones.
If active euthanasia in advanced Alzheimer’s were legal or legally 
tolerated in the United States, I think we can well imagine the rapid 
development of cost-saving social policies that would offer fairly strong 
incentives for physicians to recommend euthanasia in Alzheimer’s, say 
by reducing reimbursements for treating such persons, by limiting 
bed space for patients with this condition, or by reconceptualizing the 
practice as a humane, appropriate course of treatment in this condition.
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On the other hand, since any spread of such policies beyond advanced 
Alzheimer’s would be rapidly challenged by other groups whose own 
interests might be threatened, I see no reason to assume that even if 
active euthanasia were permitted in some sympathetic cases in ad­
vanced Alzheimer’s, involuntary euthanasia would inevitably spread 
to wholesale slaughter of the handicapped, the racially despised, or the 
politically rejected.
Thus, while I do not think the broad form of slippery-slope 
argument— which predicts the spread ol euthanasia into widespread 
holocaust— is plausible, at least in the contemporary United States, I 
can nevertheless imagine the spread of active euthanasia in Alzheimer’s 
from some few cases to a more general policy of comparatively routine 
use of euthanasia in advanced dementia, and will grant this limited 
version of the slippery-slope claim here. Routine use of active euthana­
sia in advanced Alzheimer’s might or might not involve solicitation of 
consent from family members— no doubt it often would, but in the 
same perfunctory way that consent for no-code orders is now often 
solicited— but the point is that one can imagine euthanasia as a wide­
spread, medically customary response to severe, irreversible dementia.
Suppose, then, that most or all severely demented, advanced Alzhei­
mer’s patients— all million or so—were routinely euthanized, though 
this practice did not spread to any other category of patient. This is 
the view down the slippery slope; but the question is how we should 
assess the view we see. Would this be a bad thing? How are we to 
answer this question at all? We might try to assess the effects of such 
a policy on the persons involved, but given the difficulties we have just 
experienced in considering issues of autonomy and mercy, it is not at 
all clear that this will be possible to do: We have no way of approximat­
ing a subjective assessment and no way of making an objective one 
either (Nagel, 1986). Nor can we determine whether this widespread 
practice would be just or unjust. Nevertheless, there is a way of ap­
proaching an answer, by looking down the slippery slope in a rather 
different way.
Doing so appropriates the Rawlsian device of the original position, 
in which rational self-interest maximizers who are behind the veil of 
ignorance and thus do not know their own personal characteristics 
agree to principles that will govern the society of which they are mem­
bers (Rawls, 1971). However, while Rawls does not discuss health 
policy and does not use this device for direct policy formation, specific 
features of the circumstances allow us to adopt it in a rather natural 
way. I his is made possible by the fact that, with respect to the possibil­
ity of becoming a patient with Alzheimer’s, we are naturally in a kind 
of “original position” and behind the veil of ignorance: We know the
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general incidence of severe dementia— about 1 percent between ages 
65 to 74, rising to 7 percent between 75 and 84, and to 25 percent for 
those 85 and over (Office of Technology Assessment, 1987, p. 9)— but 
as individuals we do not know whether we will be among those affected 
or unaffected. This provides us with a natural way of considering 
what principles we would assent to, in seeking to protect our own 
self-interests, and hence what policies we would be willing to formu­
late. Thus, rather than speculate about the effects of such a policy on 
others, we can ask— that is, each of us can ask— whether our own 
worlds would be better ones for us if, should we bccomc demented, 
our lives would be protected or would be terminated in euthanasia?
Clearly all the issues we have considered in reflecting on the argu­
ments from autonomy, mercy, and justice reemcrge here. However, 
since the slippery-slope argument is essentially an argument from fear 
and each potential target of the policy may in principle share this fear, 
let us look down the slippery slope from the point of view of a single 
individual who might have such fears. Thus we can ask a more personal 
form of the question, Would I be more afraid, or less so, in a world 
that practiced active euthanasia on severely demented Alzheimer’s pa­
tients? To what sort of policy would 1, without knowing into which 
category I will eventually fall, consent?
Exactly what do I fear, then, in fearing euthanasia, if the slippery- 
slope prediction comes true and I, like other Alzheimer’s patients, may 
be killed? Assume that I have not previously executed a living will 
requesting euthanasia, or even that I have no living will indicating any 
treatment preferences at all. Euthanasia performed on me will be 
clearly nonvoluntary. This is the scene I can imagine:
Golden Harbor Nursing Home. Morning. The nurses’ station in the 
hallway, then my room. A young doctor, wearing a standard white 
coat and stethoscope but with steel-rimmed glasses and a slightly 
disordered crop of thick brown hair, flips quickly through my chart. 
He extracts a little plastic-coated chart labeled “Functional Criteria 
in Alzheimer’s Disease” from his pocket, checks it, flips through the 
chart a little further. “1 think it’s time for Mrs. Battin,” he says 
absently to the nurse, then moves to my room.
“Good morning, Mrs. Battin,” he savs cheerily, though he al­
ready knows I will not respond. “What day is it today?" I tell him 
a few words, though they are not days of the week. “Who is the 
President?” I tell him a few more words, though I do not name this 
fellow Bush, and the doctor makes notes in my chart. He does a 
variety of other tests, none of which I pass. He or the other doctors 
like him have done these tests every month for the past half year,
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and I never show any improvement; now I have failed again. As he 
goes out I hear him mutter, “Yes, it’s time.” When the nurse comes 
in, she is equally cheerful. “So it’s time, Mrs. Battin, is it?” She 
also knows that I do not understand. A phone call will be made to 
one of my children, explaining the situation and proposing a date; 
this child will phone the other one, and they will agree.
They will both fly to this city, where the Golden Harbor Nursing 
Home is; and they will come here to see me for the last time. They 
do this even though they know I will not recognize them, and have 
not recognized them for some time. They will try once more to 
make conversation, though they know it is futile, because they do 
not know what else to do or how to relate to their mother. They 
will try to help me remember my husband, though I no longer can, 
and they will try to elicit even the tiniest fragment of memory. In 
between, they talk about the house and the arrangements with the 
lawyer about the estate, though they do not seem to have any partic­
ular interest in this—no, they are sad, I see a tear forming in the 
eyes of one of them, they both grasp my withered old hands, stroke 
my cheek. Iliey rub, caress my hands and cheek as if they were 
trying to implant them forever in their own memories. Now they 
are both crying. After a little while one, then the other, bends over 
the bed to kiss me. “Goodbye, Mom,” each of them finally says, 
and then they stand and leave, looking back once or twice over their 
shoulders.
'Hie young doctor is there in the corridor. “Would you like to be 
with her?” he asks. He notices their own age and the early symp­
toms of decline: One of them is 57 already, and the other almost 
60. One of them wavers a bit, but the other says no. “She wouldn't 
know we were there anyway,” he explains, but the doctor under­
stands why: They are not used to death, and it would be a difficult 
thing for them to watch. There are a few papers to sign, but that 
is all; no one objects to the procedure.
The nurse has the syringe already filled for the doctor as he 
returns to the room, and out of sheer habit she swabs the injection 
site with alcohol. I say a few more miscellaneous words, and the 
nurse puts her hand gently on my forehead as the doctor positions 
the syringe. I feel only a little prick, like so many injections I have 
had before, and then after that the doctor leans over my chest with 
his stethoscope to listen to the silence where the heartbeat had been.
So this is how it might go, in an ordinary nursing home, with an 
ordinary doctor, with an ordinary old lady in the later stages of progres­
sive dementia. If the predictions of the slippery slope arc correct, this
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is how it might go in many nursing homes, all over the country, with 
all sorts of doctors, with virtually all the 1.5 million patients in the 
late, irreversible stages of progressive dementia.
And what are my fears, as a likely victim o f this spread? Pain? Loss 
of dignity? Being constricted by involuntary choice? T he cursoriness 
of the visit from my children? Having my life ended without my 
consent by a physician I don’t even know? But of course, I can have 
experienced none of these things, and indeed my imagined account of 
these events is entirely misleading: I experienced no pain, nor any loss 
of dignity; I could not make a choice nor know if my choices were 
being countervened. 1 heard the doctor say “it’s time,” but had no way 
of understanding what he meant. Although my children’s visit was 
cursory, 1 did not recognize them as my children. 'ITiat this doctor was 
different from the previous one could not have made any difference to 
me: I could not have known whether I had ever seen him before. I did 
not know that I had passed or failed any tests, or even that they were 
tests at all. VVhat was my actual, direct experience in euthanasia? Life 
as usual until the very end, except for a gentle hand on my forehead 
and a small needle-prick in my vein. What we fear, in fearing the kind 
of widespread practice of euthanasia which the slippery slope predicts, 
are all things we can now imagine but could not then experience; in 
this sense, our most personal fears are completely unrealistic. This is 
not the comparison between subjective and objective views of the 
events contemplated, but between two different forms of subjective 
view.
What if, on the other hand, there were no euthanasia for severely 
demented patients, and, as in option #1  above, such patients were 
provided full maintenance and medical treatment?
Golden Harbor Nursing Home. Morning. Same year as before, then a 
year later, then sometime during the following year, then at various 
intervals after that. The young doctor in the corridor, but a different 
one each time. In the first episode my activities are reassigned to a 
group for more demented patients, and I now spend the days sitting 
vacantly at a table with crayons and coloring books in a continuously 
monitored day room; in the second, I am treated for a pneumonia; 
in the third, I am put in restraints in a day chair; in the fourth, 
treated for another pneumonia and also decubiti from prolonged 
sitting; in the fifth, I am spoonfed. Perhaps somewhere in the series 
I develop paranoid delusions or undergo episodes of random aggres­
sive behavior. By the end of the series, some ten or twelve years 
later, I cannot communicate at all or walk or get out o f bed or feed 
myself or bathe or control my bladder or bowels. My children have
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still made a dutiful point of coming to visit me from their respective 
cities at least once a year, and they still pay the bills, but now they 
do so with a sense of sullen resignation. The end finally comes with 
a cardiac arrest, probably about 3 a .m .,  but it is not noticed until 
the first nursing round in the morning.
So this is how it might be in an ordinary nursing home, with an 
ordinary string of doctors, for an ordinary old lady with Alzheimer’s. 
What is there to fear in this scenario? The deterioration I do not notice, 
since I cannot remember myself as I was nor compare previous stages 
to this one, nor do I recognize my children at their many visits. But I 
do experience some new things: I am feverish with infections, I feel 
the discomfort of the bedsores and, if they are not treated properly, 
smell their bad odor; I have foods put into my mouth, some of which 
I like but some I do not; I cannot move my arms out of the restraints 
on my day chair; I feel the irritation of sitting sometimes for hours in 
a diaper soiled with urine or feces. If there is any struggle at the end,
I, no doubt like many of the other million Alzheimer’s patients in the 
same condition and indeed the rest of the several million %vho will 
soon reach this condition, am alone while it happens. But it makes no 
difference; this nursing home, like most, does not perform CPR.
Is this a better scenario or a worse one than the scenario involving 
active nonvoluntary euthanasia? Clearly the effects on my children arc 
worse, since they have had no genuine contact with me for years but 
continue to make their annual visits and to pay the bills; they arc no 
longer sad, but resigned and sullen. Is it better for me? I have been 
alive for all these years; but I can think of no compelling reason to say 
I would not have been better off dead, that is, without any experience 
at all. Of course, there have been positive experiences— a shaft of 
sunlight warming my cheek through the slats of the Venetian blind in 
my window, well-meaning hugs now and then from an indefatigable 
nursing staff or from visitors I do not know— but there are also the 
diapers, the restraints, the bedsores, and the espisodes of illness and 
infection which I cannot understand but for which I am treated. If my 
claim to care under distributive scarcity rests on the assumption that 
I want this continuing life or that it is a benefit to me, is my claim 
really secure?
But what about the apparent compromise position, #2? This is the 
position that represents an increasingly pervasive policy today: to take 
advantage of intercurrent infections or illnesses and, by refraining from 
providing treatment, let the patient die. This is the compromise posi­
tion favoring passive euthanasia (though it is rarely called that), which 
rejects both indefinite extension of life and active termination. What
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would it be like, and could I fear it? The scene a t G o l d e n  Harbor will 
be the same as before, except that various you n g  d octors will not order 
treatment for various infections or illnesses, a n d  I w ill survive a few  
of these, though with difficulty, until finally o n e  o f  th em  kills me. My 
children will be summoned hastily, or perhaps after th e  fact, but will 
have had no general sense of where in the o v era ll dow nhill course of 
my progressive dementia my death might occur, w hether a few years 
earlier or perhaps a lot of years later. My sen so ry  experiences, though 
shorter, will have been in one way worse th a n  th e  second series 
above— I will have endured at least one or p erh ap s several episodes of 
illness without treatment, or with only w hatever sym ptom atic control 
is possible consistent with letting the disease ta k e  its course. T he differ­
ence between alternative # 3 , active euthanasia, and th is  one, # 2 ,  pas­
sive euthanasia, is that in the former the doctor k illed  me; in the latter, 
it is a disease that docs the killing. When the d o c to r  killed me, my only 
experience was a gentle hand and a tiny needlc-prick; in alternative # 2 ,
I am “allowed to die,” and this necessarily occurs on ly  at the conclusion 
of a period in which 1 am mortally ill.
Why then should I fear the slippery slope, o r  le t  it count as a persua­
sive argument against euthanasia? Even if w e  grant that the spread 
that this argument predicts would actually o ccu r  and som e 1.1 million 
currently institutionalized Alzheimer’s patients w ou ld  be medically 
killed, as well as the rest of the several million w h o s e  disease eventually 
progresses and in addition all new cases d evelop in g , it is not clear that 
from the point of view of each of them this would b e  a bad thing. Figures 
in the millions, of course, recall the appalling b u tch ery  of the H olo­
caust, but that killing viewed from the points o f  v iew  o f  each o f those 
victims was a catastrophically bad thing. A fter  all, th e  victims of the 
Holocaust wanted to stay alive, in the sense d iscussed  earlier, and 
would clearly have benefited from doing so. B u t  the victim s of Alzhei­
mer’s are different. After all, their points of v ie w  w ill be exactly like 
my own, accurately and not unrealistically im a g in ed , if I should de­
velop Alzheimer’s— a point of view without a sen se o f  self, without 
cognitive capacities for comparing one’s p a st and present circum­
stances, without memory, without the ability t o  understand or predict 
death, and with only the capacity for current sen sa tio n . As a rational 
self-interest maximizer who docs not yet know  w h eth er  I will or will 
not develop Alzheimer’s, can I fear euthanasia, i f  this is what my future 
may hold? Clearly the answer is no.
O f course, there may be aspects of e u th a n a s ia  I could fear— for 
instance, that the doctor would be hasty or i r re s p o n s ib le  in conducting 
the tests of functional capacity, that the n u rs e  w o u ld  be rough , that 
the nursing home would be callous in c o n ta c tin g  m y  children . To be
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sure, medical personnel and institutions can  be hasty, rough, and cal­
lous in all sorts of situations, but there is n o  special incentive for acting 
in this way in the case of euthanasia; on th e  contrary, given special legal 
protections, the presence of witnesses, and  so on, one might expect 
incentives to run the other way. If I h a v e  no  reason to fear euthanasia 
in principle and no reason to think that in  practice it would he cruelly 
conducted, there seems to be no basis fo r  responding to the slippery- 
slope argument at all. Generalizing thus from  my own imagined single 
case behind my current veil of ignorance to  that of severely demented 
persons generally, it looks, on the contrary, as though alternative #3 , 
a world of routine acti%'c euthanasia, rather than passive euthanasia or 
continuing treatment, would better p ro tect m y self-interests; hence it 
is the policy to which I would agree.
d e v e l o p i n g  s o c ia l  p o l ic y
Philosophical reflection seems to p ro d u ce  no compelling argument 
against euthanasia in advanced A lzheim er’s and no sound reason why 
we should fear it. Should we then, as a m atter  o f  social policy, practice 
nonvoluntary active euthanasia on advanced  Alzheimer’s patients, de­
veloping a set of guidelines for functional status which would serve to 
determine the appropriate timing— g u id e lin es  that the physician could, 
like the young doctor in the Golden H arb or Nursing Home, carry 
around in his pocket on a little lam inated card? If this seems a dis­
turbing suggestion, reopening all the fears th e  slippery slope points to, 
it is important to be clear about what th e  problem is.
The problem in developing policy, I th in k , arises from die difference 
in the perceptions the public is likely to  have of this issue and what 
philosophic reflection produces. O rdinary— that is, precriiical, nonre- 
flective, nonphilosophical— perceptions o f  the prospect of nonvolun­
tary euthanasia are likely to take the form  in which our little scenarios 
here have been described; it is the w ay m o st o f us see this issue most 
of the time. We tend to sec the issue from  the point of view of a 
conscious, self-aware person (ourselves n o w ) capable of remembering 
and comparing circumstances and en gag in g  in human relationships, 
not from the point of view of those p erson s actually affected by the 
practice, namely those persons who arc severely  demented (ourselves 
in a possible future). In reflecting on the nature of euthanasia and the 
possibility of the slippery slope, we do n ot readily assume the perspec­
tive of the persons most directly affected, but rather our own current 
view. ’ITiis is why the little imagined d escr ip tion s presented earlier are 
so misleading: They presuppose the w r o n g  point of view. They are 
fictions in the fullest sense, even though they purport to describe a 
possible future. The imaginary account o f  euthanasia in the Golden
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Harbor Nursing Home involves a narrated personal experience— the 
doctor enters my room, looks at my chart, asks me questions that provide 
a diagnostic test, listens to the garbled answers /  tell him, prepares to 
inject the euthanaticum into my vein. This little story is narrated in a 
temporal sequence as seen from an individual point of view, that of the 
self to whom it would happen; but of course this is a misleading de­
scription of the experience of a severely demented person. This is not 
what will happen to me, not because it will not happen, but because 
if I am severely demented, it cannot happen to me.
But while imaginary narratives of this sort— developed as a way of 
employing a natural version of the Rawlsian dcvice for selecting princi­
ples and at the same time as a way of looking down the slippery 
slope— are misleading in one way, they are enormously useful in an­
other. For they also provide a way of foreseeing what problems certain 
social policies might cause. In this sense, fiction serves as forecast. If 
it is correct that, as ordinary human beings, not philosophers, we are 
more likely to view the prospect of widespread involuntary euthanasia 
from our own current perspective than from the perspective of our­
selves in the future, a policy permitting involuntary euthanasia of mil­
lions of advanced Alzheimer’s victims might well produce considerable 
anxiety, even anguish, for most of us, depending on how these stories 
are interpreted. Of course, it is anxiety to persons before, though not 
after, they contract Alzheimer’s; but it is still a kind of anxiety to be 
considered in developing social policy. Indeed, anxiety before, rather 
than after, developing advanced Alzheimer’s is the only kind of anxiety 
which can be experienced, insofar as it is anxiety about what will 
happen in the future to oneself and hence presupposes the cognitive 
capacity both to anticipate the future and to entertain a conception of 
oneself.
Furthermore, philosophic reflection can also produce anxiety of an­
other sort for possible future Alzheimer’s patients: the anxiety of recog­
nizing that the prevailing policies #1 and # 2 , favoring continuing 
treatment or allowing to die, are really much less defensible than they 
may seem. The anxiety results from knowing that these policies are 
unlikely to changc, and that if one does develop Alzheimer’s, these 
indefensible policies will govern how one is treated. Furthermore, this 
anxiety is compounded by knowing that oncc one is in the circum­
stances in question, one can no longer do anything to changc them and 
can no longer protcct oneself from being governed by them, say by 
executing a directive stipulating exactly how one wishes to be treated.
Thus, in thinking about social policy and on what basis it is to be 
formulated, we see we are faced with two kinds of anxiety: that pro­
duced by ordinary, unreflective attitudes about euthanasia in Alzhei­
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mer’s, and that resulting from considered, philosophical reflection at 
odds with the ordinary view. These are two forms of subjective view, 
as I’ve mentioned earlier, not a subjective and an objective one, and 
neither has clear pride of place. The real question here is whether 
social policy ought to be formulated on the basis of one rather than 
the other, and if so, which one— for they will produce very different 
policies indeed. Basing policy on the ordinary view will be a vote for 
the status quo; basing it on the considered, philosophical view will 
support policies endorsing nonvoluntary active euthanasia in advanced 
dementia. Permitting active euthanasia only in conjunction with an 
antecedently executed living will or personal directive requesting it is 
probably the best policy compromise, since this appears to protcct 
against unreflective fears of nonvoluntary euthanasia but protects those 
who make antecedent choices on more philosophical grounds. Yet even 
this compromise policy provides little guarantee that, as we formulate 
social policies that will determine our own possible futures whether or 
not we contract Alzheimer’s, we will be able to keep considerations 
based on fiction distinct from those based on philosophy.
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